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I. Introduction
The manner in which a bankruptcy court determines whether a
conveyance for future production is a transfer of real property or disguised
financing is crucial for the oil and gas industry. This answer is crucial for
the oil and gas industry because these commonly used business transactions
are treated differently in bankruptcy. Depending on the court’s method, a
bankruptcy court could treat a once-purported sale as an executory contract
of the debtor’s estate, allowing a debtor to assume or reject the instrument
freely under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”).1 These instruments
tempt parties to recharacterize these transactions, depending on the
benefited legal treatment.2 The need and seeming inability to distinguish
between a purchase and a loan has led bankruptcy courts to employ
different authorities to face this issue. 3
In the oil and gas industry, a bankruptcy court’s inability to uniformly
define the interests under state law for oil and gas leases or conveyances
1. See United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 416 F.3d 609, 610 (7th Cir.
2005).
2. Id. (“What is a ‘lease’ in federal bankruptcy law? Businesses that do not pay up
front for assets may acquire them via unsecured debt, secured debt, or lease; in each event
the business pays over time. Similar economic function implies the ability to draft leases that
work like security agreements, and secured loans that work like leases.”).
3. Compare Redmond v. Jenkins (In re Alternate Fuels, Inc.), 789 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir.
2015) (recognizing the authority under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012) for recharacterization
purposes), with Grossman v. Lothian Oil, Inc. (In re Lothian Oil, Inc.), 650 F.3d 539, 542–
44 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding that recharacterization is appropriate under § 502(b) and
applicable state law).
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causes significant confusion. Under traditional oil and gas law, an oil and
gas lease is an absolute conveyance of a fee simple determinable. Under
bankruptcy law, an absolute conveyance is not an executory contract, which
means it cannot be assumed or rejected under § 365 of the Code. In the
context of federal offshore leases, this distinction becomes murkier,
because an offshore lease is treated as a true lease and not a conveyance.
Since federal leasing law controls, in the context of a federal offshore lease,
the instrument may qualify as a true lease under § 365 of the Code and be
subject to assumption or rejection.
For a debtor to freely assume or reject an oil and gas instrument under §
365 of the Code depends on the nature of the interest created as defined by
state law. 4 For example, if an oil and gas transaction conveys a real
property interest, as opposed to a personal property interest, it will not be
subject to assumption or rejection. 5 A real property interest vests in the
grantee and is a transfer of ownership. The interest is neither an executory
contract, because it is a consummated conveyance, nor an unexpired lease,
because of the transfer of ownership. For these reasons, courts must
distinguish these oil and gas instruments from executory contracts and true
leases, so the parties to the transaction retain their property interests in the
event of bankruptcy.
Under state law, a lessee in an oil and gas lease can carve out interests
and convey to a grantee either a share of ownership in production in kind or
entitlement to a share of the proceeds. In the context of state law, the
interests carved out can be divided into two general categories: (1)
overriding royalty interests, which take a percentage of the oil and gas
before drilling, free from production costs; and (2) net profit interests,
which take a percentage of the oil and gas after drilling after production
costs, which include the costs to operate and maintain wells, equipment,
and facilities. It is common for parties to enter into transactions where the
lessee agrees to convey either type of interest in increments over time, and
the counter-party agrees to pay up front for this interest to finance lessee’s
oil and gas operations. These transactions help exploration and production
(“E&P”) companies obtain financing for their ongoing business needs. Due
to E&P companies’ declining access to the traditional commercial bank
markets, 6 there is a renewed interest in carving out interests and conveying
4. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
5. Compare Terry Oilfield Supply Co. v. Am. Sec. Bank, N.A., 195 B.R. 66, 70-71
(S.D. Tex. 1996), with In re J. H. Land & Cattle Co., 8 B.R. 237, 239 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
6. See Laura Freeman, Billions of Dollars of Bad Oil and Gas Loans, OIL & GAS FIN.
J., Sept. 2017 at 6, 6-9 https://perma.cc/9EV8-AW29.
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them to parties who agree to finance a lessee’s operation. 7 Mainly in part
because smaller companies are actually better suited to be more innovative
in the way they secure investments.
When an operator conveys an overriding royalty interest to a party
financing the operation, and the royalty interests are limited by time,
quantity, value, and are free from production costs, the Code protects this
“term overriding royalty interest” from becoming property of the debtor’s
estate in the event the operator files for bankruptcy. 8 In other words, after
production has begun and a producer conveys an overriding royalty that is
limited by time, quantity, value, and free from production costs, the debtor
should not be able to assume or reject the conveyance in order to obtain
ownership for distribution to creditors under § 365 of the Code. However,
other types of interests may not be protected by the Code. 9
The protections of this safe harbor are not automatic, and structuring the
term overriding royalty as a conveyance of production payments as defined
under the Code is crucial. Although “[t]here is little, if any, case law
interpreting these provisions,” parties must be sure that their transaction is
correctly structured so that it falls within the definition of a production
payment or term overriding royalty interest provided in the Code. 10 Despite
the scant case law interpreting these provisions, companies have been
willing to use production payments to obtain liquidity by monetizing future
oil and gas production. 11 Both parties enter into the transaction intending to
make and receive an absolute conveyance of a real property interest. 12
However, depending on a court’s interpretation of the conveyed interest, in
the event of bankruptcy, the debtor could reject the instrument, forcing the
7. See Peter J. Speer, Volumetric Production Payments—Analytical Implications and
Adjustments for E&P Companies, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV. SPECIAL COMMENT Mar. 2006,
at 1 https://perma.cc/8MJY-R7PF.
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(4)(B) (2012).
9. Cf. id. § 541 (requiring production payments—similar in concept to royalty
interests—to be transferred by a written conveyance to an entity that does not participate in
the production of oil and gas).
10. Delta Petroleum Gen. Recovery Tr. v. BWAB Ltd. Liab. Co. (In re Delta Petroleum
Corp), Nos. 12-50877 (KJC), 2015 WL 1577990, at *17 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 2, 2015)
(recognizing the small amount of case law for the issue that if the overriding royalty interests
fall within the definition of “production payment” or “term overriding royalty,” they would
be excluded from “property of the estate” pursuant to § 541(b)(4)(B) of the Code).
11. See James P. Benson, Private financing Alternatives for the Independent, Executive
Report, OIL & GAS INV’R; HOUS., Spring 1994, at 11 https://perma.cc/6GNE-DBLE.
12. See generally William Knull, Jessica Crutcher, Kevin Shaw, ORRIs, NPIs and PPs:
Are They What You Think They Are?, 34 OIL & GAS INV’R 10 (2014) https://perma.cc/D8GKU2HZ.
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counter-party to file a claim for rejection damages and become a creditor,
rather than a property owner. Thus, to ensure a court can identify a real
property conveyance, parties must properly draft an instrument that will
effectuate the intentions of the parties as measured by the documents they
signed, the parties’ conduct, and their course of dealing.13
Producers that can monetize large amounts of future oil and gas
production are likely to enter into these transactions because it can be easier
to obtain financing than traditional commercial bank markets. 14 For
example, producers on the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) can monetize
future oil and gas production, which require large amounts of capital,
making it easy to enter into transactions that convey oil and gas interests in
return for needed funds.15 The OCS refers to all submerged land, its subsoil,
and seabed that belong to the United States. These are the lands extending
outward around the United States. The OCS regions of the Pacific coast, the
coast of Alaska, and the Gulf of Mexico are commonly known for vast
amounts of oil and gas production.16
Production in the Gulf of Mexico will likely continue to grow in the
future because of the yearly increase in production. 17 Oil and gas companies
interested in expanding to the OCS may enter into transactions to finance
their costly operations. Therefore, understanding the implications of
conveyances in relation to potential bankruptcy proceedings is essential to
OCS investors.

13. For a further discussion examining the current state of law on debt
recharacterization and its development, see Lawrence Ponoroff, Whither Recharacterization,
68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1217 (2016).
14. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. CULP, CORPORATE AFTERSHOCK: THE PUBLIC POLICY
LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR CORPORATIONS 183-86
(Christopher L. Culp & William A. Niskanen eds., 2003).
15. See Gulf of Mexico, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR: NAT. RESOURCES REVENUE DATA,
https://revenuedata.doi.gov/explore/offshore-gulf/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). See also
Shuqiang Feng, Insights From Stratas Advisors: Deepwater Exploration Preserves 37 OIL &
GAS INV’R 6 (2014).
16. See Pacific OCS Region, BUREAU OF OCEAN MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/PacificRegion/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019); Alaska OCS Region, BUREAU OF OCEAN MGMT.,
https://www.boem.gov/Alaska-Region/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019); Gulf of Mexico OCS
Region, BUREAU OF OCEAN M GMT., https://www.boem.gov/Gulf-of-Mexico-Region/ (last
visited Jan. 18, 2019).
17. See Jude Clemente, The Quiet Rise in U.S. Offshore Oil Production, FORBES (Apr.
10, 2018 1:13 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2018/04/10/the-quiet-rise-inu-s-offshore-oil-production/#29d69c92136e.
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However, the 2010 drilling moratorium in the Gulf of Mexico continues
to have lasting effects on operators.18 Compounded with the cyclical nature
of the industry, operators may wind up filing for bankruptcy. Parties
investing in operations on the OCS must take the necessary steps to
structure the transaction carefully as a true sale of a real property interest
that will not allow the debtor to reap the benefit of assumption or rejection
under § 365 of the Code. Thus, because it is rare for an operator and an
investor to have completely fulfilled their obligations to the agreement, it is
essential for parties interested in purchasing term overriding royalties or
production payments on the OCS to structure the transaction so that the
absolute conveyance instrument supports a true sale.
In support of this proposal, Part II outlines the mineral estate, § 541 of
the Code, and its applicability to oil and gas interests. Part III describes
some issues governing the applicability of § 365 to oil and gas leases and its
effects on a lessor’s conveyance. Part IV examines the OCS and issues that
arise when applying both sections of the Code to conveyances of oil and
gas interests. This comment explores an investor’s risks regarding oil and
gas conveyances in the event of an E&P company’s bankruptcy and why
investors should be careful when entering into transactions with E&P
companies on the OCS.
II. Fundamental Concepts: Property, the Mineral Estate
and the Bankruptcy Estate
A. Property
Property has a distinct meaning. Laypersons often think of property as a
physical object of which they can obtain physical possession—a “thing”
they can grab. However, in the legal context, property is not just a “thing.”
Instead, property is the relationship between a person and the “thing.” 19
This relationship is known as the “property interest.”20 The relationship to
the thing, often analogized as a “bundle of sticks” in which one or more
parties might hold any combination of “sticks,” describes the collection of
individual rights in the property. 21 This analogy can also describe
18. See Amanda Hale, The Moratorium and the Damage Done: Offshore Drilling After
the Gulf of Mexico Drilling Moratorium and Whether Moratoria Should Be Used, 6 LSU J.
ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 410, 416–19 (2018).
19. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 5
(3rd ed. 2000).
20. See id. at 7.
21. Id. at 3.
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ownership in mineral property, composed of separate and individual
property interests.22 For mineral property, some of the bundle of sticks
consist of the right to develop, right to make decisions in regard to E&P,
and, importantly, the right to receive and convey the lessee’s remaining
share of the mineral estate.23
1. The Basics of Oil and Gas Conveyancing
A landowner traditionally owns all that lies above and below, all the way
to heaven and all the way to hell, with certain exceptions.24 Generally, the
landowner may convey “leasehold interests, mineral interests, and royalty
interests.”25 A leasehold interest is the right to go upon the land for
“prospecting for oil and gas [and usually other minerals also], severing and
removing the same.”26
The interests that may be created in oil and gas are best understood in
relation to fee simple absolute ownership of land. 27 A, the owner in fee
simple absolute of Blackacre has the same rights to the minerals under the
surface as he has to the surface.28 Thus, A may lease, grant, or reserve the
totality of this subsurface interest separate from the surface. This severance
creates the mineral estate, the most complete ownership of oil and gas
recognized in law. B, the new owner of the mineral estate, has the same
rights as A had previously. B, therefore, is the owner of all the minerals
under the surface.29
The mineral owner holds several rights and as a result, can sever and
convey any or all of these interests. 30 B, as the mineral owner, can convey a

22. See Monika U. Ehrman, One Oil and Gas Right to Rule Them All, 55 HOUS. L. REV.
1063, 1064–65 (2018).
23. Id.
24. 1 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS
LAW § 202 (Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer eds., 2018) (2018).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 202.1.
27. Id. § 301.
28. Id.
29. See generally David D. Hunt, II, Oil and Gas Title Examination: The Basics, 1 OIL
& GAS, NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 43, 58 (2016) (describing the ownership of the
mineral estate and the oil and gas leasehold).
30. See OWEN L. ANDERSON ET AL., HEMINGWAY OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION §
9.6, at 472 (4th ed. 2004); see also Jordan D. Volino, Midstream Acreage Dedications:
Covenants Running with the Land or a Conveyancing Confusion? 2 OIL & GAS, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 397, 408 (2016).
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share of either the production or the proceeds. 31 The mineral owner can
sever these interests into fractions and convey them to several people. 32
These fractional interest owners each hold their share of the mineral estate
in its entirety.33 However, once an owner severs and conveys a mineral
interest, he loses ownership and cannot convey it again because “an owner
cannot convey more than he owns.”34 Recognizing that a mineral owner can
convey small fractions of his interest to different parties will provide
context for common oil and gas transactions.
2. The Types of Interest in the Mineral Estate
The owner of the mineral estate can convey different types of fractional
interests. A royalty interest owner is usually entitled to payment of money
measured by the proceeds of production. Typically, this royalty interest
holder does not have to pay the costs of exploration or production. 35 A
royalty interest is commonly known as a “nonworking” interest, because
they do not interfere with production but receive the benefit of the
production.36 Royalty interest owners derive their interest from the mineral
estate itself. The royalty interest and the mineral interest may or may not be
shared by a joint owner. So, where a holder of a royalty interest is not also a
holder of the associated mineral interest, they will not be involved with the
use of the land and will only receive the benefit of production.
An overriding royalty is much like a royalty interest but is generally
“used to describe a royalty created from a lease that is in favor of a person
other than the lessor.”37 In other words, the party receives what is known as
a non-landowner royalty, not an overriding royalty. Rather, this additional
royalty other than the royalty created in the original lease allows a lessee to
carve and convey an overriding royalty out of his interest. So, continuing
the example above, the owner of the mineral estate can sever and convey an
overriding royalty interest.38
Net profit interests are like overriding royalty interests. Usually, a net
profit interest is a contractual, rather than property, right to receive an
31. 1 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 24, § 301.
32. Id.
33. See ANDERSON, supra note 30, § 9.8, at 481.
34. Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 103 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v.
Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d 369, 377 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006), rev'd, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex.
2008).
35. 1 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 24, § 202.3.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id.
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amount of money from production measured by a contractual formula. Net
profit interests are only payable to the net profit interest holder after the
mineral owner profits from production in excess of the formulaic amount
during the contractually agreed-upon period. 39 A true net profit interest is
not an absolute conveyance. However, it is possible to create an absolute
conveyance of a net profit interest for a term of years or measured by
money, which can begin to look like a production payment discussed
below. The more the net profit interest looks like a production payment, the
more it resembles an absolute conveyance. Still, these interests are only
payable after productions costs have been satisfied. 40
Production payments, known as term overriding royalty interests, oil
payments,41 and volumetric production payments (collectively “Production
Payments”),42 are also similar to an overriding royalty interest. This interest
is a fractional interest “carved out” from the lessee’s interest, the working
interest, “which is a share of the minerals produced from described
premises, free of the costs of production at the surface.”43 A mineral
owner’s conveyance of a Production Payment ends when the agreed-upon
“volume of production has been paid over or when a specified sum from the
sale of such oil” has been realized.44 Production Payments are common
when an investor purchases some of the mineral interest in order to finance
an E&P company’s operations. For example, a mineral owner may use
Production Payments for debts owed to lenders or investors. An investor
can also use Production Payments to obtain a return on capital provided to
the operator.45 Once the Production Payment holder has received their
portion of production, the interest terminates. 46
The difference between a Production Payment and an overriding royalty
interests is that a Production Payment is “limited to the time required for
the stated number of units of production or the sum specified in the
instrument creating the oil payment.” 47 An overriding royalty will normally
have “the same duration as the working interest out of which it was
39. See id. § 424.1.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 422.
42. See, e.g., McCall v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 509 F. App'x 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2013).
43. QEP Energy Co. v. Sullivan, 444 F. App’x. 284, 289 (10th Cir. 2011).
44. 2 PATRICK H. MARTIN AND BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
LAW § 422 (LexisNexis Mathew Bender 2018) (footnote omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. § 422.3.
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created.”48 Therefore, E&P companies have more freedom and liquidity
with Production Payments because an interest holder can convey
Production Payments frequently and to many different parties. Although a
Production Payment relationship is advantageous in some respects, some
courts have suggested the transaction creates a debtor-creditor
relationship. 49 However, commentators believe this is erroneous. 50 The
differing analyses have resulted in divergent state law approaches as
bankruptcy courts apply applicable state law to determine the debtorcreditor relationship.
B. Bankruptcy
The Code explicitly adopts the legal definition of property. 51 The instant
a person files bankruptcy, an “estate” is created, which consists of “all legal
or equitable interest of the debtor in property.” 52 The interests in “property”
the debtor holds, i.e., whichever stick he holds, is brought into the estate
and is known as property of the estate. 53 As a result, whatever interest in
property the debtor holds as of the date of filing will become property of the
estate. 54
1. Property of the Estate and the Types of Interests in the Mineral Estate
The concept of “property of the estate” in a bankruptcy case is important
because it “establishes the ‘what’ in the core question of ‘who gets what’ in
the bankruptcy distribution.”55 State law limits whether the debtor holds an
interest in property and the analysis of that interest will differ from state to
state.56 The Code’s “property of the estate” is applied in broad strokes in an
attempt to capture every imaginable interest. 57 For this reason, the debtor

48. Id.
49. E.g., PSI, Inc. of Mo. v. Aguillard (In re Senior-G & A Operating Co.), 957 F.2d
1290, 1297 (5th Cir. 1992); Posey v. Fargo, 174 So. 175, 180 (La. 1937).
50. 2 MARTIN, supra note 44, § 422.2 (“An occasional case, erroneously we believe, has
said that the relationship created by an oil payment is that of debtor and creditor.”).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012).
52. Id. § 541(a)(1).
53. Id. § 541(a)
54. Id.
55. CHARLES J. TABB, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY, 415 (4th ed. 2016) (“The Code embodies a
strong congressional policy favoring maximization of the size of the estate so that creditors
may be paid as much as possible on their claims.”).
56. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10 (1924).
57. See TABB, supra, note 55 at 396.
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and his creditors, the “who,”58 will try to capture every conceivable interest
the debtor may hold, so property owned by the debtor becomes “property of
the estate” and there is more to distribute to creditors in the bankruptcy
case.59 Parties who arguably already own property interests formerly
belonging to the debtor will attempt to keep their interest severed to prevent
the interest from becoming property of the estate.
That said, just as the Code defines what becomes “property of the
estate,” it also defines what “property of the estate does not include.” 60 The
Code provides a “safe harbor” for certain kinds of oil and gas interests. 61
Section 541(b)(4)(B) of the Code provides that the assignee of a Production
Payment takes title to the interest and that interest will not become property
of the estate if the assignor files for bankruptcy. 62 The Code defines the
term “production payment” as a “term overriding royalty satisfiable in cash
or in kind” that is “(A) contingent on the production of liquid or gaseous
hydrocarbon from particular real property; and (B) from a specified
volume, or specified value, from the liquid or gaseous hydrocarbon
produced from such property.”63 The Code also defines a “term overriding
royalty” as “an interest in liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons in place or to be
produced from particular real property that entitles the owner thereof to a
share of production, or the value thereof, for a term limited by time,
quantity, or value realized.” 64 In simpler terms, when the debtor conveys
Production Payments to a party, these interests will not become property of
the estate.
This interpretation is consistent with the section’s legislative history,
which reveals that Congress did not intend to permit a “conveyance of a
production payment or an oil and gas lease to be recharacterized in a
bankruptcy context as a contractual interest subject to rejection under
58. The estate representative (i.e., the trustee or the debtor in possession) acts under
provisions of the Code to benefit the debtor’s estate, which ultimately benefits the debtor’s
creditors upon distribution. Koch Ref. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339,
1348 (7th Cir. 1987) (“It is axiomatic that the trustee has the right to bring any action in
which the debtor has an interest.”).
59. See e.g., Abele v. Phoenix Suns Ltd. (In re Harrell), 73 F.3d 218, 219 (9th Cir.
1996) (rejecting the argument that debtor’s ability to renew Phoenix Suns season tickets was
property under Arizona state law as such an opportunity is a mere expectancy).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b) (2012).
61. Id. § 541(b)(4)(B) (amended in 1994 to exclude oil and gas interest from property of
the estate).
62. Id. § 541(b)(4)(B).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 101(42A) (2012) (emphasis added).
64. Id. § 101(56A) (emphasis added).
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section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.” 65 Section 541(b)(4)(B)’s safe harbor
provides that “any interest of the debtor in liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons
to the extent” that the debtor has “transferred such interest pursuant to a
written conveyance of a production payment to an entity that does not
participate in the operation . . . the estate could include the interest . . . only
by virtue of section 365 or 542 of this title.”66 Thus, Production Payments
will not become “property of the estate” if the transferee can demonstrate
(1) the existence of a transfer of the “production payment” pursuant to a
written conveyance; (2) the grantee does not participate in the operations;
and (3) the debtor could only include Production Payments into the
bankruptcy estate by virtue of other sections of the Code. 67
III. Issues in § 365 of the Code
Section 365 of the Code provides that a trustee or debtor in possession
“may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor.”68 This power is broad and allows the debtor to choose which
instruments to assume and reject since “burdensome obligations can impede
a successful reorganization.”69 A debtor can assume favorable executory
contracts and unexpired leases, so the debtor can benefit from them
throughout reorganization. 70 Section 365 of the Code is a valuable tool that
benefits the debtor’s estate in bankruptcy. 71 Although § 365 of the Code has
nothing to do with a debtor-creditor relationship, if the debtor rejects a §
365 executory contract, then the counter-party has the right to file a claim
for rejection damages, eventually becoming a creditor of the estate, if
successful.
Determining whether § 365 of the Code applies to an oil and gas
transaction presents troubles in its application, because state law ultimately
decides whether a debtor can assume or reject an instrument that was
originally intended to convey fee simple rights. Thus, the important point
for § 365 of the Code is to determine if the relevant interest is an absolute
65. 140 CONG. REC. E2204-01 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1994) (statement by Rep. Brooks).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(4)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).
67. Id.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
69. Century Indem. Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co. Settlement Tr. (In re Nat’l Gypsum Co.),
208 F.3d 498, 504 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528
(1984)).
70. Carlisle Homes, Inc. v. Azzari (In re Carlisle Homes, Inc.), 103 B.R. 524, 534
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1988).
71. See id.
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conveyance of a property interest. If so, then the interest is outside the
scope of § 365.
A. Executory Contracts v. Unexpired Leases
In the context of bankruptcy, the ability to assume or reject an oil and gas
lease and the resulting applicability of § 365 of the Code depends on the
nature of the interest as determined by state law. 72 In bankruptcy, the use of
specific terms within a conveyance does not automatically render the
property interest therein as real property, the primary consideration a court
will use to determine whether an interest passes into the debtor’s estate. If
state law characterizes the conveyed interest as a real property interest, then
the debtor cannot assume or reject the instrument because it is a true sale of
ownership and not a “true lease,” as the legislative intent suggests. 73
As sales of real property are not typically undertaken through an
executory contract or a lease, the determination of an absolute conveyance
has important implications in a bankruptcy proceeding. A debtor that can
assume or reject an instrument under § 365 of the Code has substantial
power to assume beneficial contracts or reject burdensome leases.
However, if the instrument cannot be assumed or rejected, then the parties
retain all obligations, burdens, and benefits under the instrument.
1. What is an Executory Contract?
An executory contract is one where failure to perform the ongoing
obligations on both sides must be such that a failure to perform those
continuing obligations would constitute a material breach of the contract. 74
If an instrument before a bankruptcy court is an executory contract, then §
365 of the Code governs, and the debtor may assume or reject the interest.
The Code does not define the term executory contract but generally
includes contracts where there are material unperformed obligations on
both sides; executory contracts can cover various types of transactions. 75
Most transactions will involve some type of executory contract. For
example, a purchase and sale agreement is an executory contract. Other
similar agreements can also be executory contracts. Although a sale of a
72. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979).
73. See In re Clark Res., Inc., 68 B.R. 358, 359 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986) (noting the
Bankruptcy Amendment and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 intended to remedy § 365 of the
Code when applied to commercial leases and not necessarily oil and gas leases).
74. E.g., id.
75. See Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1075 n.13
(3d Cir. 1992) (noting an agreement to provide medical services to be executory).
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term overriding royalty interest as defined under the Code may look like an
executory contract, a debtor cannot assume or reject the instrument if §
541(b)’s safe harbor applies. However, as discussed infra, if § 541(b) does
not apply, the debtor may assume or reject the instrument by virtue of § 365
of the Code.
2. What is an Unexpired Lease?
A debtor can only assume true leases under § 365 of the Code. As the
Code does not define an unexpired lease, courts will apply state law. 76
Courts look behind the label of the instrument to decide its true character. 77
For example, a true lease is one where the landlord turns over possession to
the tenant in exchange for rental payments and provides the lessee a simple
possessory interest, rather than ownership.
Bankruptcy courts have used § 365 of the Code to recharacterize a
purported lease as disguised financing arrangements by sheer vigilance. 78
These courts resolve whether a transaction was a disguised financing
instrument by applying state law.79 In adopting the Code, Congress
intended for courts to examine the true substance of the transaction on a
case-by-case basis to discover if a lease is a true lease or a financing
instrument.80 The legislative history states that “the fact that the lessee
assumes and discharges substantially all the risks and obligations ordinarily
attributed to the outright ownership of the property is more indicative of a
financing transaction than of a true lease.”81 Thus, courts scrutinize leases
for substance over form to determine if the lessee has more than just a
possessory interest and is, in fact, an owner. 82
3. How Are They Similar and How Are They Different?
At first glance, the similarity between executory contracts and unexpired
leases may be apparent. First, both parties still have certain obligations to
76. River Prod. Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 739 n.17 (5th Cir. 1990)
(“While we interpret the Bankruptcy Code as a matter of federal law, state law determines
whether these contracts constitute unexpired leases subject to Section 365.”).
77. See United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 416 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir.
2005).
78. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.02[3] (16th ed. 2013).
79. Id.
80. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 64 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5850
(“Whether a ‘lease’ is a true or bona fide lease or, in the alternative, a financing ‘lease’ or a
lease intended as security, depends upon the circumstances of each case.”).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. See United Airlines, Inc., 416 F.3d at 612.
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perform. Second, both are a type of agreement to perform obligations
within a certain time period. However, scrutinizing these instruments show
their differences.
An instrument may not be an executory contract if the only remaining
performance to be rendered is a payment of money. 83 In contrast, if the
remaining performance is a payment of money, the conveyance may be
deemed an unexpired lease if the lessee has a possessory interest and the
lessor is the owner.84 Some bankruptcy courts may consider transactions
over drilling rights for oil and gas as unexpired leases of real property if
drilling never occurred because the agreement was a right to use the real
property, not own it.85
Considering whether there has been an effective and consummated
conveyance under state law is the key to determining if an instrument is an
executory contract in bankruptcy. However, if an instrument is neither an
executory contract nor an unexpired lease, then § 365 of the Code will not
apply at all.86
B. The Applicability of § 365 to Oil and Gas Leases
The reliance of bankruptcy courts on respective state laws to establish
the classification of the rights in an instrument, creates disparate results.
The initial question to consider before considering conveyances of
Production Payments is what an oil and gas lease is. At its core, the oil and
gas lease represents an owner selling his interest to someone that will
remove oil and gas in the future. In the context of state law, the execution
of an oil and gas lease removes some of the lessor’s sticks in the bundle,
such as the “right to possess, use, or dispose of the oil and gas in, upon or
under the land in question,” and vests them in the lessee. 87 In other words,
the lessor is giving ownership of the oil and gas to the lessee.
Some states have recognized that an oil and gas lease grants an
ownership interest in the oil and gas.88 In these cases, such a lease is a “sale
83. See Magdovitz Family Tr. v. KY USA Energy, Inc. (In re KY USA Energy, Inc.),
449 B.R. 745, 750 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2011).
84. See, e.g., In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 306 B.R. 43, 82 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
85. See In re Gasoil, Inc., 59 B.R. 804, 806 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).
86. See In re KY USA Energy, Inc., 449 B.R. at 748; see also United Airlines, Inc. v.
HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 416 F.3d 609, 610 (7th Cir. 2005).
87. Wayne C. Byers & Timothy N. Tuggey, Oil and Gas Leases and Section 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code: A Uniform Approach, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 337, 339 (1989) (citing Texas
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (citation omitted)).
88. Id.
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of a fee interest in the oil and gas in place.” 89 As such, some states
acknowledge “[t]he term ‘lease,’ when used in an oil and gas context, is a
misnomer.”90 Instead, “[t]he common oil and gas lease creates a
determinable fee. It vests the lessee with title to oil and gas.”91 The “rules
applicable to ordinary tenancies” do not apply, because these leases do not
create the ordinary landlord-tenant relationship that grants a lessee a
possessory interest rather than ownership. 92 In other words, in these states,
an oil and gas lease can best be described as a conveyance of ownership
rights with a reversionary interest in the remaining mineral estate after the
producer has extracted oil and gas.
The conveyance in oil and gas leases is distinct from an ordinary lease.
Although the conveyance vests the lessee with ownership in the minerals, in
the bankruptcy context, it often appears to be an executory contract or an
unexpired lease, invoking § 365 of the Code. Although the lessee returns
the property to the lessor after he has removed the oil and gas that has been
conveyed to him, the transaction seems to be both a true sale and an
instrument that fits under § 365 of the Code. The nature of the reversionary
interest has confused some bankruptcy courts, despite the conveyance of a
real property interest.93 Under state law, some oil and gas leases convey
ownership with a reversionary interest, but oil and gas leases have disparate
interpretations in bankruptcy when applying § 365 of the Code. 94
The Fifth Circuit has recognized § 365 of the Code’s applicability to this
distinction. 95 It noted that “oil and gas leases considered to be freehold
estates by the governing state law do not constitute ‘unexpired leases’ under
the Code and therefore Section 365 does not govern their assumption or
rejection.”96 For example, the court noted, “[i]n Oklahoma, oil and gas
leases are not unexpired leases of real property subject to assumption or

89. Id.
90. Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. 1982).
91. Id.
92. Phillip G. Whaley, Bankruptcy: Is § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code Applicable to
Oklahoma Oil and Gas Leases?, 40 OKLA. L. REV. 99, 105 (1987).
93. See generally Mark W. Wege, Oscar N. Pinkas & Lauren Macksoud, Does the
Second Circuit in Sabine Have the Final Word on Texas Law? 37-AUG AM. BANKR. INST. J.
24, 78 (discussing a court’s decision holding gathering agreements as executory contracts
allowing the debtor to reject the gathering agreements).
94. Id.
95. See River Prod. Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 739 n.17 (5th Cir.
1990).
96. Id.
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rejection.”97 However, when there is a reversionary, and therefore
leasehold, interest “Section 365 does govern their disposition.” 98
An “unexpired true lease” and an “executory contract” differ from each
other but courts use the terms executory contract and unexpired lease
interchangeably when applying them to oil and gas leases. Generally, courts
understand an executory contract to mean an instrument where both the
debtor and the counter-party have sufficient remaining obligations that
nonperformance would not constitute a material breach, and a “true lease”
varies across jurisdictions. 99 Since the Code fails to define either term,
“courts apply nonbankruptcy state and federal law to determine the nature
of the interest for the purposes of assumption or rejection.” 100 Therefore, the
different approaches by bankruptcy courts in determining whether an oil
and gas lease is a true lease or an executory contract is relevant to § 365’s
applicability when applied to conveyances of Production Payments because
courts will follow the same approach.
1. Oil and Gas Leases as Executory Contracts?
Whether the oil and gas lease qualifies as an executory contract depends
on different factors. If an oil and gas lease can be an executory contract,
then it problematically “ignores the fundamental principles of executory
contract theory and the substantive nature of the rights created by an oil and
gas lease.”101
In states where there is a conveyance of ownership rights in real
property, an oil and gas lease can never be executory because both sides
have materially performed their obligations with respect to the conveyance.
If there is an absolute conveyance of a property interest, then it is not an
executory contract and cannot be rejected under § 365 of the Code.
Although there is plenty to be done by the lessee, such as operations, these
operations do not have to be done in order for the conveyance to be
effective. So whether an oil and gas lease is within reach of § 365
ultimately depends on whether the oil and gas lease conveys a real property
interest.
Whether parties to an oil and gas lease have performance due on both
sides depends on the terms of the oil and gas lease. It is uncommon for an
97. Id. (citing In re Clark Res. Inc., 68 B.R. 358 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986)).
98. Id.
99. See Camisha L. Simmons, Is That Exploration and Production Lease Really a
Lease?, 37-DEC AM. BANKR. INST. J. 50, 50 (2018).
100. Id.
101. Byers & Tuggey, supra note 87, at 352.
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oil and gas lease to be executory because neither party has unperformed
material obligations. The oil and gas lease is an absolute and consummated
conveyance. Thus, nothing is left for an effective conveyance. For example,
once there has been an effective conveyance, the lessee must commence
drilling operations. The lessor has no further obligations, and the lessee’s
sole remaining obligation is to make royalty payments to the lessor(s). 102
However, it is crucial to recognize that the operations or royalty payments
do not have to be performed in order for the conveyance to be effective. For
this reason, an oil and gas lease is not executory. Naturally, if operations are
not commenced or continued within the negotiated primary term, then the
mineral estate will revert to the lessor, but this reversion is unrelated to
whether the original conveyance was effective.
Nonetheless, a leading commentator has described an oil and gas lease as
always being executory in nature.103 Professor Kuntz has recognized the
lessor-lessee relationship as an “executory contract in that it contains
elaborate contractual provisions which continue in force between the lessor
and the lessee during the life of the interest granted” 104 This argument is
“even more compelling if the lessor is still in a position to breach the
lease.”105 Thus, an oil and gas lease may appear to fit into the definition of
an executory contract.
Despite this argument, the legislative history of § 365 of the Code might
provide a more applicable definition for conveyances of oil and gas
interests.106 The legislative history provides that while “there is no precise
definition of what contracts are executory, it generally includes contracts on
which performance is due to some extent on both sides.”107 Some courts
accept this as the definition of an executory contract.108 However, the
competing theories of Professor Kuntz’s definition and the traditional
definition of an executory contract in § 365’s legislative history causes
different results.
For example, if an oil and gas lease contains agreements to discover and
produce gas, and parties have not commenced these obligations, a court
may conclude that the lease is an executory contract; had lessees complied
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
id.
108.

See Whaley, supra note 92, at 103.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
Id.
Byers & Tuggey, supra note 87, at 343.
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 58 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5844; See
Byers & Tuggey, supra note 87, at 344, n.29.
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and discovered gas, the property interest, the gas, would have vested in the
lessee. 109 On review of In re Powell, however, an appellate opinion vacated
and remanded the bankruptcy’s courts legal conclusion that the oil and gas
lease is an executory contract or unexpired lease. 110 Thus, the issue of
whether the oil and gas lease creates an executory contract seemingly
turned on whether there was a conveyance of, or an agreement to use,
certain property that would then vest after the party satisfied their
obligation.111
The different definitions from Professor Kuntz and the legislative history
can lead courts to contradictory results for this one instrument. However, is
it reasonable that the continued payment of specified royalties is enough to
characterize an oil and gas lease as an executory contract because the
payment of royalties constitute an ongoing obligation? According to the
Code, 112 once the lessee conveys the interest in the oil and gas lease, it will
vest in the lessee. 113 The correct analysis thus provides that an oil and gas
lease could never be executory, because if there is an absolute conveyance
that is effective and consummated, as there is in an oil and gas lease, then it
is not executory.114
2. Oil and Gas Leases as Unexpired Leases?
Individuals familiar with an oil and gas lease know that it is not an
ordinary lease. As discussed above, the term “‘oil and gas lease’ is a
misnomer because the interest created by an oil and gas lease is not the
same interest created by a lease under landlord and tenant law.” 115
Nonetheless, this instrument may constitute an unexpired lease under § 365
of the Code depending on how state law treats the mineral estate. 116
In states where the fee simple owner of the mineral estate severs and
divests the mineral estate through an oil and gas lease, the owner makes a

109. Powell v. Anadarko E&P Co. (In re Powell), 482 B.R. 873, 877–78 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa. 2012), vacated in part, 2015 WL 6964549.
110. Chesapeake Appalachia LLC v. Powell (In re Powell), 2015 WL 6964549, at *8
(M.D. Pa. 2015). A party will appeal a bankruptcy court’s finding to the district court.
111. See id.
112. 11 U.S.C. § 101(56A) (2012).
113. See Tennant v. Dunn, 110 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex. 1937).
114. Id.
115. River Prod. Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 740 n.17 (5th Cir. 1990).
116. See id.
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conveyance of a real property interest. 117 If an oil and gas lease were an
unexpired lease, and a debtor could apply § 365 of the Code, the result
would be “quite simply an exaltation of form over substance.”118 The lessee
would have ownership if he complies with the lease. For example,
bankruptcy courts applying Texas state law have established that an oil and
gas lease is not a true lease but instead is a transaction that conveys a real
property interest.119 As a result, under Texas law, an oil and gas lease is not
an unexpired lease; if the debtor is a lessor, then he is not an owner. He may
not assume the lease into the bankruptcy estate, and the lessee retains his
ownership interest.120
Bankruptcy courts have reached a similar conclusion when applying
Oklahoma law.121 The specific legal right transferred under an oil and gas
lease in Oklahoma is something more than an “incorporeal hereditament or
a profit à prendre.”122 The interest is one in land and grants the lessee the
rights to explore and remove something from the land to the lessee’s
benefit. 123 As a result, under Oklahoma law, an oil and gas lease is not an
unexpired lease because an oil and gas lease is termed as a qualified fee
simple, not a true lease. 124
Federal law governing oil and gas leases is also inconsistent. The Tenth
Circuit noted “where no right of the federal government is involved, state
law governs,” and federal courts will look to state law to decide the nature
of the onshore oil and gas lease interest. 125 In Bolack, the Tenth Circuit
applied state law to hold that the interest in a federal onshore oil and gas
lease was real property.126 Thus, if applicable state law established the
interests were real property interests, making the lessee the owner of the
mineral estate, a bankruptcy court would likely find that a federal onshore

117. See, e.g., Terry Oilfield Supply Co. v. Am. Sec. Bank, N.A., 195 B.R. 66, 70 (S.D.
Tex. 1996) (finding that a debtor cannot assume or reject a mineral lease since it conveys
real property).
118. Byers & Tuggey, supra note 87, at 353.
119. Terry Oilfield Supply Co., 195 B.R. at 70.
120. Id.
121. Compare In re Clark Res., Inc., 68 B.R. 358, 359 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986) with
Shields v. Moffitt, 984 OK 42, ¶¶ 10–13, 683 P.2d 530, 532.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Shields v. Moffitt, 1984 OK 42, ¶¶ 10–13, 683 P.2d 530, 532.
125. Bolack v. Underwood, 340 F.2d 816, 819–20 (10th Cir. 1965).
126. Id.
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oil and gas lease would not be subject to assumption or rejection under §
365 of the Code.127
Determining property interests is also complicated for federal offshore
oil and gas leases. The United States has asserted that an OCS lease is a true
lease of real property because it is a rental agreement to use real property
and does not give the lessee ownership rights in the mineral estate. 128 The
United States asserted that the OCS leases were also executory contracts
because the lessee must continue to make royalty and rental payments and
the United States must provide the lands for development and supervise
development.129 For these reasons, the United States argued that the oil and
gas leases are within reach of § 365 of the Code. 130 That said, bankruptcy
courts have yet to resolve how to classify offshore oil and gas leases. 131
IV. How the Applicability of the Code Will Affect Production on the OCS
A. What is the OCS?
The United States regulates the OCS through the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (“OCSLA”). 132 The OCS is comprised of the submerged lands
three miles offshore from state coastlines. 133 The OCS consists of 1.7
billion acres divided into four regions of submerged lands, subsoil, and
seabed: the Gulf of Mexico, Atlantic, Pacific, and Alaska regions. 134 In
January 2017, the Federal Gulf of Mexico contributed 1.7 million barrels
per day and accounted for the highest annual average of crude oil
production to date due to new projects and increased production.135 As new
projects continue to be planned and approved, production will likely
127. See id.
128. See, e.g., NGP Capital Res. Co. v. ATP Oil & Gas Corp. (In re ATP Oil & Gas
Corp.), No.12-03443, 2014 WL 61408 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2014).
129. See, e.g., id.
130. See NGP Capital Resources Co.'s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment Against ATP
Oil & Gas Corp. at 9, NGP Capital Res. Co. v. ATP Oil & Gas Corp. (In re ATP Oil & Gas
Corp.), No.12-03443, 2014 WL 61408 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2014) (No. 12-36187).
131. Camisha L. Simmons, Offshore Oil and Gas Leases: The Unanswered Question, 36SEP AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 19 (2017).
132. 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
133. Id. § 1301(a).
134. The
Continental
Shelf,
BUREAU
OF
OCEAN
ENERGY
MGMT.,
https://www.boem.gov/The-Continental-Shelf/ (last visited Jan, 18, 2019).
135. Gulf of Mexico crude oil production, already at annual high, expected to keep
increasing, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TODAY IN ENERGY (Apr. 12, 2017),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=30752.
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continue to increase and operators will likely consider production on the
OCS and use the associated capital to fund their projects. The vast
quantities of production available give operators the ability to monetize
future production to obtain capital for projects. 136 Therefore, E&P
companies will be attracted to produce on the OCS and consider monetizing
future oil and gas production in order to expand and continue projects.
B. What is the OCSLA?
OCSLA recognized the OCS as a “vital national resource reserve held by
the Federal Government for the public, which should be made available for
expeditious and orderly development.” 137 Specifically, OSCLA asserted
that the OCS “appertain[s] to the United States.”138 The intentional use of
the curious phrase “appertain to,” rather than “owned by,” still declares that
the OCS is subject to the United States’ jurisdiction, control, and power of
dispositions, implying that the United States Federal Government is the
owner of the OCS.139
Before the enactment of OCSLA, there was a significant dispute between
the federal government and certain coastal states regarding the ownership of
the OCS.140 The United States sued California, Louisiana, and Texas, 141
arguing that the federal government’s rights over the continental shelf were
“paramount over the rights of all three states.” 142 In response to the three
cases, Congress enacted OCSLA and the Submerged Lands Act. 143
OCSLA authorizes the federal government to lease OCS lands to private
companies for E&P.144 The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(“BOEM”) and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
(“BSEE”) are in charge of leasing and regulating OCS lands. 145 OCS leases
136. Lauren Hunt Brogdon, Note, A New Horizon?: The Need for Improved Regulation
of Deepwater Drilling, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 291, 294 (2012).
137. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3) (2012).
138. Id. § 1332(1).
139. Gerald F. Slattery, Jr., Contractual Choice of Law Issues on the Outer Continental
Shelf, 49 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 737, 743 (2017) (citing § 1332 and discussing the odd phrasing
and the United States’ legal battle to obtain ownership but ultimately using the language
“appertain”).
140. See generally id. at 740-44.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
145. See The Reorganization of the Former MMS, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.,
https://www.boem.gov/Reorganization/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
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function similarly to a traditional oil and gas lease.146 The United States
receives profits in royalty and rental payments by leasing the rights to
explore and drill for minerals to private developers. 147
Operators are likely to consider production on the OCS because of its
rise in crude oil production. 148 However, because of the continuing rise in
bankruptcies proceedings, some involving oil and gas producers, and the
general nature of the oil and gas industry, companies that engage in
offshore E&P might seek capital from investors by offering Production
Payments due to the guaranteed capital and secured financing. 149
1. OCSLA’s Choice of Law Provision
Because bankruptcy applies state law, operators interested in capitalizing
the OCS should pay particular attention to the choice of law scheme. The
choice of law provision in OCSLA is a “densely worded” and important
provision that decides what law applies. 150 Section 1333(a)(2)(A) adopts as
surrogate federal law “the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State” as
long as they are “not inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal
laws and regulations of the Secretary.”151 The adjacent state’s law applies to
the subsoil, the seabed, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected
thereon. 152 The OCSLA considers a state adjacent if such areas, islands, or
structures “would be within the area of the state if its boundaries were
extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf.” 153
For example, offshore oil and gas contracts may include choice-of-law
provisions where the parties agree that the law of a particular state will
govern the interpretation and enforceability of their contract.154 However, if
OCSLA governs the contract, a bankruptcy court would apply the law of
the adjacent state according to the federal statute and ignore the parties’

146. See 43 U.S.C § 1337.
147. Id.
148. See Slattery, supra note 139, at 738 n.2.
149. See HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP, OIL PATCH BANKRUPTCY MONITOR (Mar. 31, 2018),
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/Files/Energy_Bankruptcy_Reports/2018/Oil_Patch_
Bankruptcy_Monitor_09102018.pdf. Haynes and Boone updates its Oil Patch Bankruptcy
Monitor often, and the number of bankrupt E&P companies will often change.
150. Slattery, supra note 139, at 744.
151. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Slattery, supra note 139, at 749 (citing Stoot v. Fluor Drilling Servs., Inc., 851
F.2d 1514, 1517 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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choice of law provision. 155 The law of the adjacent state would then govern
§ 365’s applicability to the oil and gas interests. Therefore, despite stating
an axiomatic point, it is essential to know which state’s law governs and the
associated law of that state and its property rights.
C. Production Payments on the OCS
As discussed earlier, for § 541(b)(4)(B) of the Code—regarding the
analysis of Production Payment instruments as conveyances of real
property—to apply and protect these interests in the event of bankruptcy,
the debtor must show that (1) there was a transfer of the “production
payment” pursuant to a written conveyance; (2) the grantee does not
participate in production operations; and (3) other provisions of the Code,
such as § 365, do not include the interest into the debtor’s estate. 156 If a
debtor meets these three elements, the Production Payments do not become
property of the estate.
Similar to an oil and gas lease between a private surface owner and a
business entity, the United States government only leases to individuals,
corporations, and partnerships who are qualified to be an assignee of an
OCS lease. 157 A leaseholder can assign its interest with BOEM approval. 158
However, this restriction only concerns the land, not anything an operator
produces, such as oil and gas.159 With conveyances, Production Payments,
and similar “carved out” interests, the BOEM only requires a filing to have
the transaction on record.160 These non-required filings do not require
approval. 161 As a result, the lessee in the OCS has the freedom to negotiate
and enter into transactions with respect to oil and gas interests.
The transaction for a Production Payment consists of three documents:
“[(1)] a Purchase and Sale Agreement, [(2)] a Conveyance of Overriding
Royalty, and [(3)] a Production and Delivery Agreement.” 162 First, the
purchase and sale agreement states the terms and conditions of the transfer
that will govern the transfer of production from the grantor to the grantee.
Second, the conveyance of the Production Payment addresses the transfer
155. Id.
156. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(4)(B) (2012).
157. See 30 C.F.R. § 556.402 (2016).
158. Getting It Right the First Time, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT. (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://www.boem.gov/2017-NALTA-Presentation/.
159. See id.
160. 30 C.F.R. § 556.715 (2016).
161. Id.
162. Jeffrey S. Muñoz, Financing of Oil and Gas Transactions, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS &
ENERGY L. 223, 230 (2009).
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of what the operator will produce and what adjustments might be necessary
to make up for shortages. Finally, the production and delivery agreement
covers issues of marketing, gathering and transportation, and processing.
These documents allow the grantor and grantee the opportunity to mitigate
risks in the transaction. 163 They also ensure there is a successful transaction
between the parties. 164 This type of purchase and sale agreement is a
common and properly structured conveyance of Production Payments. 165
1. Is it a Transfer?
Bankruptcy courts could recharacterize the instrument because it is not a
transfer of a Production Payment under a written conveyance. Analyzing
the definition of a Production Payment under the Code presents issues. The
Code defines the term “production payment” in two subparts.166 First, the
Production Payment or “term overriding royalty” is “contingent on the
production of a liquid or gaseous hydrocarbon from particular real
property.”167 Second, the “term overriding royalty” must be “from a
specified volume, or a specified value, from the liquid or gaseous
hydrocarbon produced from such property and determined without regard
to production costs.”168 The Code further defines the term “term overriding
royalty” as “an interest in liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons in place or to be
produced from particular real property that entitles the owner thereof to a
share of production.”169
The Code’s definitions for a Production Payment suggests that payments
should be produced from the real property. 170 The provision may allow a
producer to deliver regular shortfalls later with interest, as long as the
Production Payment or term overriding royalty is still produced from the
“real property.”171 For example, if a provision in the instrument allows the
producer to make up missed Production Payments or term overriding

163. See Charles E. Harrell et al., Securitization of Oil, Gas, and Other Natural Resource
Assets: Emerging Financing Techniques, 52 BUS. LAW. 885, 906 (1997).
164. See id.
165. Muñoz, supra note 162, at 230.
166. 11 U.S.C. § 101(42A) (2012).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. § 101(56A).
170. See id.
171. See Jeff Nichols, Karl Burrer & Ellen Conley, Volumetric Production Payments in
Bankruptcy, 58 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 11 (2016).
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royalties from the previous term, it is possible the transaction will not be at
risk of recharacterization if they are still from “such property.” 172
In contrast, if an operator substitutes missed Production Payments from
other property not described in the instrument that produces oil and gas,
then it may not meet the first element of a transfer. If there was a provision
in the instrument that would force the grantor to substitute missed
payments, it would likely still be a transfer. However, if the provision
places a substantial penalty to ensure delivery and allows substituted
Production Payments from other properties, it moves away from the Code’s
definition of a transfer from “such property” and risks being possibly
recharacterized as a loan.173 In any event, classification and treatment will
remain unsolved absent judicial guidance.
Although a provision that motivates or penalizes shortfalls in production
but allows the grantor to make up these shortfalls may risk being
recharacterized, parties must consider the context of the oil and industry.
The volatility and continued exploration for production may increase a
company’s ability to make up shortfalls on the OCS rather than onshore. A
producer can make up shortfalls on the OCS because of the potential of vast
future production, but a lessor in a state without such production
capabilities will have trouble making up deficits.
The use of technical terms or descriptive titles is not determinative of
whether the conveyance of Production Payments is a transfer or a disguised
financing transaction. 174 Bankruptcy courts have held that “substance will
not give way to form, that technical considerations will not prevent
substantial justice from being done.” 175 Using their equitable powers, 176 or
express provisions of the Code, 177 bankruptcy courts can interpret what was
intended as a Production Payment or term overriding royalty as a disguised
financing instrument.178 Although determining whether a Production
172. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(42A) (2012).
173. See Speer, supra note 7, at 2 (discussing how “make-whole” provisions apply to
interruptions of production payments).
174. See PSI, Inc. of Mo. v. Aguillard (In re Senior-G & A Operating Co.), 957 F.2d
1290, 1296 (5th Cir. 1992).
175. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939).
176. Redmond v. Jenkins (In re Alternate Fuels, Inc.), 789 F.3d 1139, 1148, (10th Cir.
2015).
177. See Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothian Oil Inc.), 650 F.3d 539, 544 (5th
Cir. 2011) (noting that state law principles can be used to determine if a transaction needs to
be recharacterized); see also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 51–54 (1979).
178. See, e.g., Cor Route 5 Co., v. Penn Traffic Co. (In re Penn Traffic Co.), 466 F.3d 75,
77 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing the party’s attempt to recharacterize the instrument).
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Payment is an executory contract or a disguised financing instrument is
within the bankruptcy court’s power, it can have devastating effects on the
evaluation of Production Payments.
Recharacterization is the power of a bankruptcy court to examine the
economic reality of an instrument and establish the true substance of the
transaction. 179 In the bankruptcy context, recharacterization is fact specific
and determined “case-by-case.”180 Although recharacterization rarely takes
places within the oil and gas context, the body of law that has developed in
oil and gas transactions can help to understand how courts establish the true
character of a transaction.
Although there is a “strong presumption that a deed and lease . . . are
what they purport to be,” a bankruptcy court can still find that the
transaction is something other than a conveyance if certain factors are
present.181 Bankruptcy courts will use various factors to determine the
correct characterization of the transaction. 182 The factors are similar to
determining whether a transaction constitutes a true lease: (1) whether the
transactions were rental payments or were structured to ensure or guarantee
a return on an investment; 183 (2) whether the purchase price related to fair
market value or whether it was calculated as the amount necessary to
finance the transaction; 184 (3) whether the property was purchased for the
lessee and not the lessor; and (4) whether the lessee assumed many of the
obligations normally associated with ownership.185
In sum, the “question for the court then is whether . . . the true nature of
the transaction, [is] such that the legal rights and economic consequences of
the agreement bear a greater similarity to a financing transaction or to a
sale.”186 Although the Code facially intends to exclude Production
Payments from the debtor’s estate, such payments still result in contested
interpretations due to the absolute conveyance of oil and gas reserves and
179. Redmond v. Jenkins (In re Alternate Fuels, Inc.), 789 F.3d 1139, 1146–48 (10th Cir.
2015).
180. Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448,
454–56 (3d Cir. 2006).
181. Liona Corp. v. PCH Assocs. (In re PCH Assocs.), 804 F.2d 193, 200 (2d Cir. 1986)
(quoting Fox v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 25 B.R. 674, 688 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982)).
182. See Hotel Syracuse Inc. v. City of Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency (In re Hotel
Syracuse, Inc.), 155 B.R. 824, 838 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1993).
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 544 (3d Cir.
1979) (footnote omitted).
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an obligation to produce and deliver the Production Payments. 187 In other
words, the absolute conveyance of a Production Payment begins to look
similar to a financing transaction or a loan. Because Production Payments
risk being recharacterized, parties should avoid providing a court with the
ability to recharacterize a transfer of Production Payments into a loan.
In In re Senior-G & A Operating Co., an E&P company entered into a
“Production Payment Loan Agreement” with an investor.188 The investor
advanced $5.1 million to the E&P company in exchange for Production
Payments. 189 The E&P company filed bankruptcy and the bankruptcy
trustee asserted that the investors were secured creditors and would need to
pay certain costs with the maintenance and improvement of its collateral. 190
Investors denied that they were secured creditors and asserted they were
owners of term overriding royalty interests who were receiving Production
Payments. 191 The Fifth Circuit found that, because the interest did not
constitute a term overriding royalty, the investors were not owners. 192
Furthermore, the court relied on the instrument’s language to determine that
the investors were secured creditors and that there was a lien on the
hydrocarbons.193 The Fifth Circuit recharacterized the agreement to convey
these interest into a loan.
In In re ATP, the defendant, a lessee on the OCS, conveyed to the
plaintiff, an investor of the defendant’s company, $700 million worth of
term overriding royalty interests and net profit interests through sixteen
agreements.194 The defendant argued that these transactions were “disguised
financing” transactions and should be part of the bankruptcy estate. 195
Although the transactions were labeled unambiguously, the court analyzed
the objective substance of the transaction. 196 The court ultimately
recharacterized the transactions as loans because of the high interest rate,
the characteristics of a loan, the treatment of the conveyance as a loan for
187. See Speer, supra note 7, at 2 (recognizing that production payments are a type of
hybrid transaction that require both a conveyance and an obligation to produce and deliver
oil and gas reserves).
188. In re Senior-G & A Operating Co., 957 F.2d at 1293.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1294–95.
191. See id. at 1295.
192. See id. at 1296.
193. Id. at 1296–97.
194. NGP Capital Res. Co. v. ATP Oil & Gas Corp. (In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp.),
No.12-03443, 2014 WL 61408, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2014).
195. Id.
196. Id. at *5.
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tax purposes, and the production as artificial to payment. 197 To the court,
the terms were consistent with a disguised financing instrument.198
Although state law establishes the nature of the interests, there are some
precautions individuals can take to avoid a court recharacterizing a true sale
as disguised financing. If the parties can effectuate a conveyance of real
property, such transactions should avoid a relationship analysis as between
a secured creditor and debtor.199 These secured creditor rights, such as a
“lien and security interest secure only the . . . obligations under the
purchase and sale agreement.”200 The benefit of conveying real property is
that it segregates the provisions creating the secured creditor rights from the
conveyance, “which will (hopefully) assist a court’s interpretation of the
documents.”201 Moreover, there would be no language in the conveyance
that would make investors a secured creditor, unlike in In re Senior-G &
A.202 Although bankruptcy courts can use the “collapse doctrine” to collapse
a “series of transactions and treat[] them as a single integrated transaction,”
parties can minimize the risk of a court construing the transaction as a
whole by containing the debtor-creditor rights within the final purchase and
sale agreement.203
Individuals looking to enter transactions with producers on the OCS
should avoid the factors courts use to evaluate whether a conveyance of oil
and gas interests is a loan.204 In structuring these transactions, individuals
should not emphasize the return on investment and instead emphasize the
fact that it is a purchase of Production Payments owed over a period of
time. 205 Structuring the transaction to avoid classification as a loan under
tax law will help.206 Individuals should also be sure to describe specifically
the Production Payments by volume or time instead of by revenue or total
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See Michael P. Pearson, A Primer on Production Payments, 28TH ANN. ADVANCED
OIL, GAS AND ENERGY RESOURCES L. COURSE, (State Bar of Tex., Austin, Tex.), Sept. 16-17,
2010, at ch. 11, 25-26, https://docplayer.net/6362040-A-primer-on-production-payments-bymichael-p-pearson-jackson-walker-l-l-p-houston-texas.html.
200. Id. at 35.
201. Id.
202. See PSI, Inc. of Mo. v. Aguillard (In re Senior-G & A Operating Co.), 957 F.2d
1290, 1299 (5th Cir. 1992).
203. LaRosa v. LaRosa, 482 F. App’x, 750, 755 n.3 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting In re
Sunbeam Corp., 284 B.R. 355, 370 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
204. See, e.g., In re PCH Assocs., 804 F.2d 193, 200–01 (2d Cir. 1986).
205. See id.
206. See 12 U.S.C. § 636(b) (2012).
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price in order to distinguish their Production Payments from dollar
dominated production payments (“DDPP”). Because “‘DDPP’ give the
carved out interest owner the right to receive a fixed dollar amount
generated from the property” they differ from Production Payments and are
defined as “‘borrowings’ by the Financial Account Standards Board.” 207
However, the Financial Account Standards Board defines Production
Payments as a “transfer of a mineral interest.”208 The differences are
essential in determining how likely a court is to recharacterize the
instrument. Thus, individuals interested in entering into transactions with
producers on the OCS need to carefully structure and draft their
transactions.
2. Is the Individual Participating in the Operation?
The second element to establish that a Production Payment does not
enter the debtor’s estate under § 541(b) of the Code requires the buyer not
to participate in the production or operation of the property from which the
Production Payments are transferred from. The Code uses the terms
“participate” and “operations,” but does not define them. 209 Therefore,
bankruptcy courts employ the plain meaning of the words, in which
“participation” generally means “take part.”210 The term “operations,”
within the context of oil and gas leases, means the “production of
minerals.”211
Determining if the operator participates in the operations is resolved by
looking at the instrument and the parties’ conduct. 212 For example, many
agreements contain a provision that requires the grantee’s consent to enter
into certain contracts.213 Additionally, this definition excludes Production
Payments for service providers.214 How broadly a court reads the terms
207. DAVID J. KARP & PARKER J. MILENDER, INVESTING IN OIL AND GAS ROYALTIES:
DISTRESSED COUNTERPARTY RISK CONSIDERATIONS, at 3 (Mar. 2015), (citations omitted)
https://perma.cc/2UEY-RM97 (explaining that the difference means production payments
can be more likely to be recharacterized if the owner of the production payment is entitled to
higher interest for late payments).
208. Id.
209. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b) (2012).
210. See Powell Elec. Sys. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., Civil Action
No. H-10-993, 2011 WL 3813278, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Aug 29, 2011).
211. See Nichols et al., supra note 171, at 12.
212. See id.
213. See id., See also Muñoz, supra note 162, at 233.
214. See Rhett G. Campbell, A Survey of Oil and Gas Bankruptcy Issues, 5 TEX. J. OIL
GAS & ENERGY L. 265, 284 (2010) (“This is unfortunate language because it is not
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“participate” and “operations,” will determine whether or not a grantee’s
Production Payments are excluded from the debtor’s estate. 215 That said,
courts have yet to develop this issue fully.216
Individuals who consider entering into transactions with producers on
the OCS should not have a problem with this requirement. In ATP, the court
recognized that the producer retained operational control and the counterparty had no right to develop or operate the property. 217 Because these
operations are done on the OCS, the second requirement is easier to meet.
However, if Offshore Support Vessels assist in production, this element
would likely not be met, mainly because Offshore Support Vessels would
assist in operations by participating and performing services. 218
3. Is it Subject to Inclusion Provisions of the Code?
Part of the final requirement to exclude Production Payments from the
debtor’s estate under § 541(b)(4)(B) is determining that the Production
Payment would not be included in the debtor’s estate except by operation of
§ 365 of the Code.219 As discussed supra, § 365 of the Code provides a
debtor with certain powers regarding executory contracts and unexpired
leases.220 This section allows a debtor to reject a contract, which breaches
the obligation and provides the counter-party with a right to file for
rejection damages, then making the counter-party a creditor.221 Section
541(b)(4)(B) would prevent the debtor from attempting to reject the
agreement to retain the hydrocarbons used for the Production Payments
unless the debtor can show the existence of the required elements.
However, debtors can also reject the instrument under principles of state
law. The critical analysis is whether the interest conveyed is real or
personal property. As discussed in Part III, if the oil and gas interests are
real property, then there was an absolute and consummated conveyance out
uncommon for one party to take a production payment as compensation while providing
services on the property, sometimes even conducting operations.”).
215. See id.
216. See Pearson, supra note 199, at 19.
217. NGP Capital Res. Co. v. ATP Oil & Gas Corp. (In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp.),
No.12-03443, 2014 WL 61408 at *11, *12 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2014).
218. See Robin Sebastian Koske Rose, Future Characteristics of Offshore Support
Vessels 27-34 (Mar. 22, 2011) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology) (on file with Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (discussing the future
possibilities of Offshore Support Vessels) https://perma.cc/XS7Y-SMBG.
219. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(4)(B)(ii) (2012).
220. § 365(b).
221. Id.
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of the estate at the time of the transaction. 222 As a result, the same analysis
to determine if § 365 applies to oil and gas leases can be applied to
Production Payments. Primarily, if the considered interest is an absolute
conveyance of a real property interest, then it is not an executory contract
and cannot be rejected.223
OCSLA’s choice of law scheme means that individuals must verify that
the applicable state law defines the Production Payment as real property.
For example, an individual interested in negotiating with a company
drilling on the OCS off the coast of Alaska, Alabama, or Mississippi will
need to determine the nature of the property interest conveyed in an oil and
gas instrument to determine if the state has unsettled law characterizing and
defining the property interest. In Louisiana, there is a split in law regarding
whether an oil and gas lease is an executory contract or an unexpired
lease.224 Therefore, individuals interested in contracting with operators on
the OCS adjacent to Louisiana would need to draft the intent of parties
carefully.225 However, if the OCS lease is adjacent to Texas, the property
interest is real property. Thus, the investor’s Productions Payment would
remain the property of the investor in the event of bankruptcy and would
not enter the debtor’s estate because it was an effective and consummated
conveyance at the time of transaction. 226

222. See supra Part III.
223. Contra In re Heston Oil Co., 69 B.R. 34, 36 (N.D. Okla. 1986) (holding that an oil
and gas lease is not an unexpired lease or executory contract within the purview of 11 U.S.C.
§ 365 but is in the nature of an estate in real property having the nature of a fee) with In re
Gasoil, Inc., 59 B.R. 804, 808-09 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (concluding that the oil and gas
leases at issue are covered by § 365) and In re P.I.N.E., Inc, 52 B.R. 463, 465 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1985) (holding § 365 did not apply to an oil and gas lease that expired in its primary
term) and In re Integrated Petroleum. Co., 44 B.R. 210, 214 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)
(treating oil and gas leases as assumable or rejectable contracts).
224. Compare In re WRT Energy Corp., 202 B.R. 579, 583-84 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1996)
(holding that a mineral lease in Louisiana is not an executory contract), with Texaco, Inc. v.
La. Land & Expl. Co., 136 B.R. 658, 668 (M.D. La. 1992) (holding that a mineral lease
under Louisiana state law is an executory contract) and Texaco Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs for
the LaFourche Basin Levee Dist. (In re Texaco Inc.), 254 B.R. 536, 565 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2000) (holding that a mineral lease under Louisiana state law is an executory contract).
225. See, e.g., Patrick S. Ottinger, Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 60 LA. L.
REV. 765, 766–72 (2000).
226. See River Prod. Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 739 n.17 (5th Cir.
1990).
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Nonetheless, recharacterization for these transactions is still possible
under § 365 and other provisions of the Code. 227 The issue is that transfers
of Production Payments—and the context of their creation—do not fit
neatly into every section of the Code. There is little predictability, because
these transfers occur in the discretionary areas of the Code. To minimize
the risk that a bankruptcy court will impose its own interpretation on an
instrument, individuals should clearly structure their transaction as an
absolute conveyance supporting a true sale rather than a loan in disguise.
The context of a transaction is relevant to a court’s analysis and may be
persuasive against finding a true sale. For example, an investment company
that has entered into transactions with an operator and knows the operator
may soon file for bankruptcy may seek to negotiate a new contract. If the
instrument contains provisions that result in severe penalties for missed
payments and allows for production from other operators, the resulting
evidence suggests the investment company intends to take advantage of the
soon-to-be-bankrupt operator. In other words, the investment company is
forcing the operator to convey the rest of the soon-to-be debtor’s property,
leaving nothing for creditors. Bankruptcy courts will view this as a
disguised loan and recharacterize the transaction. However, the cyclical
nature of the oil and gas industry can disguise when a company is in true
distress. The new contract may not have been predicated on potential
bankruptcy at all, yet it may appear so to the bankruptcy court. Therefore, it
makes it difficult to know when the transaction is disguised financing.
Some have opined that the OCS is only for “big players,” but this
observation could reflect the difficulty smaller players face trying to receive
the capital needed to produce.228 Production Payments generally allow
227. The following cases represent examples of courts applying their recharacterization
power. Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448,
455 (3d Cir. 2006), Fairchild Dormier GHMB v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In
re Dornier Aviation (N. Am.) Inc.), 453 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2006) (both courts
authorizing judicial recharacterization under §105(a)); City of S.F. Mkt. Corp. v. Walsh (In
re Moreggia & Sons, Inc.), 852 F.2d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Our analysis of the Code
and the legislative history and purpose of section 365(d)(4) convinces us that the appropriate
focus is on the federal law purposes of Section 365(d)(4) and the economic realities of this
particular arrangement.”); Liona Corp. v. PCH Assocs. (In re PCH Assocs.), 804 F.2d 193,
198 (2d Cir. 1986) (“As discussed below, the legislative history of section 502(b)(6) of the
Code mandates that a court look beyond mere form to the circumstances of each case,
including the economic substance of the transaction, to determine whether a ‘true lease’
exists for purposes of the Code.”).
228. Jordan Blum, Ensco buying Houston's Atwood Oceanics, HOUS. CHRONICLE (May
30, 2017), https://perma.cc/H242-NUGW.
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companies to become “big players,” but the OCS seems to restrict potential
“big players” by preventing them from capitalizing on their production. 229
Therefore, the Code’s goal of incorporating every interest into the debtor’s
estate potentially obstructs the development of oil and gas, with potential
bankruptcies threatening the ownership rights of an investing party in its
mineral interest.
The benefits of becoming a fractional interest holder of production off
the OCS comes with associated risks. The Code’s underlying policy of
creating an expansive debtor’s estate, arguably for the benefit of creditors,
may hurt an investor’s incentive to finance future projects on the OCS. If
the absolute conveyances are characterized as loans, bankruptcy
proceedings could eliminate their financial interests.
V. Conclusion
Although varying results in bankruptcy may make investors wary of
entering into oil and gas conveyances via Production Payments or term
overriding royalty transactions, case law interpretation and the Code
provide a road map of the risks associated with such transactions between
producers and investors. The OCS is the second largest production region in
the nation, and it may continue to grow. Those looking to produce on the
OCS will need financing. Production Payments are an excellent way to
invest in companies, and more significant investment opportunities lead to
enhanced competition and better production of domestic resources. With
increased production in the OCS in the coming years, the opportunities to
invest will be greater, so long as the parties can mitigate the bankruptcy
risks.
Parties need to take proper precautions when entering murky and
uncharted waters of the OCS, notwithstanding the inherent risks of the oil
and gas industry. The issues concerning OCS leases and transactions make
it difficult for the smaller E&P companies to prosper, so investors should be
mindful of minimizing the risk of a bankruptcy court recharacterizing a
purchase into a loan.

229. See Nerijus Adomaitis, Out of bankruptcy, Seadrill eyes closer ties with oil service
firms, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/8FB2-DJJZ; see also Hyperdynamics files
for bankruptcy, OFFSHOREENERGYTODAY.COM (Dec. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/T4MFUQD6.
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